肖志娟, 解建仓, 孔珂, 李亮. 应急调水效益补偿的博弈分析[J]. 水科学进展, 2005, 16(6): 817-821.
引用本文: 肖志娟, 解建仓, 孔珂, 李亮. 应急调水效益补偿的博弈分析[J]. 水科学进展, 2005, 16(6): 817-821.
XIAO Zhi-juan, XIE Jian-cang, KONG Ke, LI Liang. Game analysis for emergent water dispatch compensation[J]. Advances in Water Science, 2005, 16(6): 817-821.
Citation: XIAO Zhi-juan, XIE Jian-cang, KONG Ke, LI Liang. Game analysis for emergent water dispatch compensation[J]. Advances in Water Science, 2005, 16(6): 817-821.

应急调水效益补偿的博弈分析

Game analysis for emergent water dispatch compensation

  • 摘要: 应用博弈论原理与方法求解应急调水的合理补偿量,解决调水各方的利益冲突.提出了水权交易、行政调节、流域协商3种补偿的方式,用博弈原理对这3种方式进行了分析,求解在纳什均衡条件下,利用水权交易方式和行政调节方式实现水资源配置目标的补偿量方案,并对流域协商方式的博弈特性进行了分析,并给出算例,分别解出两种补偿方式的补偿方案.不同的补偿方式对应着不同的补偿量,在实际应用中可根据应急调水的实际情况,选择一种方式或多种方式联合应用,为管理者的决策提供参考.

     

    Abstract: The paper educes a reasonable compensation for emergent water dispatch using the game theory in order to solve the benefit conflict among the different sides.The three compensation modes,water rights trade,administrative intermediation and watershed negotiation,are offered and analyzed with the game theory respectively.Based on the Nash equilibrium,the compensation schemes of the two water resource collocating modes,the water rights trade and the administrative intermediation are gained,and the game properties of the watershed negotiation is analyzed,which can be used as references to the administrators.In practice,single or multiform modes can be used based on the especial facts.

     

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